



Oakfield Community Primary & Nursery School

Bomb, Evacuation & Lockdown Policy

2023 - 2025

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Head teacher's Checklist:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Head teachers to develop procedures as per the Policy; 2. Staff to familiarize themselves with bomb and threat alerts and evacuation procedures; 3. Managers and staff to ensure that they are aware of their responsibilities, as per the plans, during bomb and threat alerts and subsequent evacuations; 4. Head teachers to identify Evacuation and Assembly officers; 5. Head teachers to ensure that the procedures are tested; and 6. The governing bodies of schools are directed to adopt the policy, as from time to time revised, and implement its procedures. 	



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1. INTRODUCTION

The [Terrorism Act 2000](#) defines terrorism as the use or threat of action which: involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person's life (other than that of the person committing the act); creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system

The use or threat of such action must be designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and must be undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

1.1. Terrorist Methods

Terrorists can use many different methods of attack. As well as using tried and tested methods, they are able to innovate, as demonstrated on September 11th 2001 with the co-ordinated hi-jacking of four passenger planes in America. More recently in Paris we have seen a complex plot involving multiple attackers and various weapons, all co-ordinated to occur simultaneously. Methods which might be used by terrorists might include:

Explosive Devices

These can be delivered to their targets in vehicles, by post or by a person.

An explosive device within a vehicle, a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED), is a common means of attack for some terrorist groups. VBIEDs were frequently used by the IRA during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. International terrorist groups such as Al Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) often use suicide operatives in vehicles to improve the likelihood of the explosives detonating at the required moment.

Suicide bombers can also carry an explosive device about their person, a Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED), and into the vicinity of a target location as was seen in Manchester in 2017.

Dissident republican groups in Northern Ireland continue to use a range of explosive devices. In 2011 an under-vehicle device was responsible for a death in Omagh, and several other such devices have been deployed since. Pipe bombs and radio-controlled, victim-operated and postal explosive devices have also been used in Northern Ireland recently.

Vehicles Borne Threats

Vehicle borne threats include VAW (Vehicle as a Weapon) and VBIED threats. Such threats might range from vandalism to sophisticated or aggressive attack by hostile individuals or groups.

Vehicles to be used as a VAW threat are widely available to those with hostile intent and such individuals or groups may have previously gained access to them through several means:

- Owned – A vehicle which is already in the possession of those with hostile intent;
- Borrowed – A vehicle is lent by an associate, knowingly or otherwise;
- Leased – A vehicle is hired from a legitimate company using either genuine or faked documentation;
- Stolen – A stationary, unattended vehicle is taken without the owner's consent; or

- Hijacked – An occupied vehicle is taken forcefully from the rightful owner and without their consent.

It is worth noting that during a VAW attack the driver is unlikely to comply with the rules of the road and they may:

- Traverse over green spaces such as fields, parks, other recreational areas, grass verges, etc.;
- Park illegally;
- Ignore traffic signals;
- Drive at speed;
- Drove on the wrong side of the road;
- Mount footways; or
- Enter pedestrianised zones.

VBIEDs are an improvised explosive device which is either visible or concealed within a vehicle and transported to the hostile's target. The blast stand-off (the distance between the target / asset) is the most important factor in determining the extent of damage that can be caused. Maximising the blast stand-off distance will reduce the damage sustained to the target / asset.

VAWs threats might include those with hostile intent deliberately driving a vehicle:

- At an individual or into crowds of people to cause fear and harm; or
- Deliberately driving a vehicle into infrastructure to damage or disrupt its operation and cause fear. This may indirectly lead to harm people through the disruption of operation at the site / event, or more widely through disruption to the supply of critical services.

VAW attacks are frequently the first part of a layered attack. A layered attack is a threat which combines different types of attacks and which may involve a vehicle facilitating the delivery of armed attackers, covertly or overtly, and may or may not be combined with a VAW or VBIED attack. Such attacks are discussed in the following section, Marauding Terrorist Attacks.

Marauding Terrorist Attacks

Marauding terrorist attacks (MTAs) are fast-moving, violent attacks where assailants move through a location aiming to find and kill or injure as many people as possible. Most deaths occur within the first few minutes, before police are able to respond. Terrorists enter a busy area aiming to kill or injure as many people as possible. The attackers then begin marauding, travelling on foot or in a vehicle, to find and kill or injure more people. Attackers are drawn by movement and deterred by seemingly unoccupied locations as well as by anything that may take time and effort to overcome, such as a locked door. The terrorists may take hostages, resulting in a longer siege. Attacks may conclude with the arrest, death or escape of the terrorists.

MTAs can take many forms, such as; a lone attacker, multiple attackers or multiple groups of attackers; arrival at a location on foot, in a vehicle (VAW) or an attack perpetrated by insiders; entering without using force or forcing entry using an explosive device, a vehicle, coercion of someone with access or a combination thereof; and attackers might be armed with bladed weapons, guns, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) such as pipe bombs or petrol bombs or they might have multiple weapons. These types of attacks might also be referred to as 'shootings and close quarters attacks'.

Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Devices

Fortunately to date, no such attacks have taken place in the UK. Alternative methods of attack, such as explosive devices, are more reliable, safer and easier for terrorists to acquire or use. Nevertheless, it is possible that Al Qaida, ISIL or other terrorist groups, across the spectrum, may seek to use chemical, biological or radiological material against the West.

In April 2005, an Algerian with known links to Al Qaida, was convicted of plotting to manufacture and spread poisons, including ricin, in the UK. He was sentenced to life in prison for the plot, and for fatally stabbing a police officer during his arrest.

1.2. Terrorist Organisations

There is not one type of terrorist or terrorism. It originates from a variety of countries and terrorists have multiple ethnic, racial, religious or political identities and have different views, aims and purposes.

Some examples:

International Terrorism

International terrorism refers to terrorism that goes beyond national boundaries in terms of the methods used, the people that are targeted or the places from which the terrorists operate.

Terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), possess both the intention and the capability to direct attacks against the West. The UK is a high-priority target for Islamist extremists and they pose a significant threat to our country. Despite the current main focus on terrorism originating from Syria and Iraq, the threat of terrorism also emanates from other parts of the Middle East and regions such as North, East and West Africa, South and South East Asia.

The majority of terrorist attack plots in this country have been planned by British residents. There are several thousand individuals in the UK who support violent extremism or are engaged in Islamist extremist activity. Some British nationals travel overseas to train with extremist groups and return to the UK with the view to plan attacks, but increasingly the terrorist threat from within the UK emanates from individuals radicalised by individuals and material online. Once radicalised, an individual might decide to conduct an attack in the name of Islam without any prior signs of radicalisation. Simple, self-organised attacks by UK-based Islamist extremists have increased and are inherently harder to detect than more complex and ambitious plots.

Northern Ireland-related Terrorism

Northern Ireland-related terrorism continues to pose a serious threat to British interests. Although the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has ceased its terrorist campaign and is now committed to the political process, some dissident republican groups continue to mount terrorist attacks, primarily against the security forces.

Extreme Right Wing Terrorism (ERWT)

Recent years have seen a rise in cases of extreme right wing terrorism in the UK. Extreme right wing terrorists promote messages of hate-filled prejudice which can encourage radicalisation among people motivated by race hate. Groups including (the now proscribed) National Action, Sonnenkrieg Division and The Base have been under scrutiny for promoting offensive, anti-Islamic messages which run contrary to the values of respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.

Left, Anarchist and Single-Issue Terrorism (LASIT)

As the heading suggests this covers the use or threat of actions, as described earlier, by those who might be motivated by ideologies and causes associated with left-wing or anarchist movements, groups, individuals or thinking and those who are similarly motivated by a single-issue.

The term 'single-issue' in this context is used as something of a catch-all as it can variously be used to describe anything from ethnic or nationalist terrorism, such as Sikh terrorism to groups using criminal means to change a specific policy or practice, as opposed to replacing the entire political, social and economic system in a society. The groups within this category are concerned, for example, with animal rights, environmental protection or anti-abortion campaigns, as well as many other fringe organisations which are difficult to categorise.

There has been an increased focus from the security services in recent years with regard to the risks posed by LASIT threats. They are however, thankfully, still perceived to be less of a threat than those posed by International, Northern Ireland-related and Extreme Right Wing threats.

1.3. Threat Levels

The threat faced by the nation as a whole is determined by the [Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre](#) (JTAC) and the [Security Service](#) (MI5). There are 5x levels of threat:

LOW	An attack is highly unlikely.
MODERATE	An attack is possible but not likely.
SUBSTANTIAL	An attack is likely.
SEVERE	An attack is highly likely.
CRITICAL	An attack is highly likely in the near future.

As of 10th June 2022 the threat level for the UK is SUBSTANTIAL.

The current threat level for the UK can be found by visiting the [MI5](#) website.

1.4. Perspective

It is worth noting that hostile criminal acts can be carried out which don't fall within the legal definition of terrorism but which would likely result in a similar outcome with regard to fear and disruption. As such, whilst there will be mention throughout this document of terrorism, terrorist actions and the use or threat of such actions, the guidance set out within this policy document should be used to guard and mitigate against all threats, irrespective of the motivation of the person or persons carrying out such hostile criminal acts.

Whilst the threat of terrorist related crime is ever present it is equally important to keep the threat in perspective. Terrorist related incidents nationally and which result in a successful attack are rare and as such the threat within Halton as a borough remains low.

2. SCOPE

Head teachers are to establish written procedures within their setting and are to ensure that they, their staff and all other users of the building familiarise themselves with such procedures and understand the differences between these procedures and those established for a fire evacuation. A flow-chart outlining the steps to be taken with regard to notification of the police and relevant departments and decisions which can be taken in a relevant emergency situation can be found in [Appendix E](#) and can be used to aid development of procedures within your setting. Once established the procedures can be summarised using [Appendix C](#) and must be communicated to staff.

These procedures can also be used when there are external threats (see [Section 1.1](#)) and there is a need to move to places of safety possibly within the building whilst decisions over whether to evacuate externally or internally being established ('lockdown').

The types of threats can be very broadly broken down to:

- **Hoax threat warnings**, designed to disrupt, test reactions or divert attention;
- **Genuine threat warnings**, these may be attempts to avoid casualties or enable the terrorist to blame others if there are casualties. It is important to note however, genuine threat warnings can still provide inaccurate information about where, when and how a threat might develop, this may or may not be deliberate; and
- **Discovered threats**, this type of threat might be represented by, for example, a suspicious device which may or may not be disguised or made to look like something more innocuous. These types of threat may or may not be genuine and may or may not turn out to be malicious. They should however **always** be treated as a genuine threat until such time as they can be determined to **not** be a threat. This will most likely require consultation with the police or appropriate emergency service in order to determine an appropriate and proportionate response.

To report anything suspicious there is a confidential [Anti-Terrorist Hotline 0800 789 321](#). In an emergency you should always call **999**. People with speech or hearing difficulties and who use a text phone can call **0800 032 4539** (text messages from mobiles are not accepted).

3. THE LAW

[The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999](#) (MHSWR) puts a duty on employers to establish, and where necessary put in place appropriate procedures to be followed in the event of serious and imminent danger at work and to nominate sufficient competent persons to implement those procedures in so far as they relate to the evacuation of persons from their premises.

4. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

It is imperative that clear roles and responsibilities are defined and assigned to persons competent to fulfil that role, consideration should also be given to ensuring sufficient coverage in the event of planned and / or unplanned absences. Once roles and responsibilities have been established the information should be shared with all users of the building so that in the event of a relevant emergency incident all users of the building are clearly aware of the procedures in place and the appointed persons who will be coordinating the response.

4.1. Bomb, Threat and Lockdown Co-Ordinator (BTLC)

Head teachers are encouraged to take on rather than appoint the role of Bomb, Threat and Lockdown Co-Ordinator (BTLC). The purpose of the BTLC is take charge of bomb threats or any other hostile threat related incident within their respective setting. Their responsibilities will include:

- Taking control of the situation within their setting and assessing all available information
- Liaising with the police
- Coordinating the decision to search
- Coordinating the decision to evacuate (external or internal) and when to reoccupy their setting

It is important that BTLC's always remain alert to the threat from terrorism and other hostile actions and the many forms which they can take. This can be done by visiting:

- [NaCTSO – National Counter Terrorism Security Office](#);
- [Counter Terrorism Policing](#);
- [CPNI – Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure](#); or by
- Contacting Cheshire CTAs at ctsa@cheshire.pnn.police.uk.

The decision to evacuate will be based on the information received about the threat and there are broadly speaking four options (see also [Section 6](#), [Section 7](#) and [Appendix E](#),

- a. **Do nothing** – this would represent a low level threat that could include a hoax call from a child or drunk, however, if there is the slightest doubt the BTLC must adopt one of the following options;
- b. **Search the premises without immediate external or internal evacuation** - this again would represent a low level threat and with no credible reason to believe that the threat could cause imminent danger or harm; or
- c. **Search the premises with a partial external or internal evacuation** - the size of the object found and / or the nature of the threat identified will inform whether a partial evacuation, to an external safe place, or evacuation, to an internal safe place is required; or
- d. **Full and immediate external evacuation** - the size of the object found and / or the nature of the threat identified will inform whether a full and immediate evacuation, to an external safe place, is required.

4.2. Evacuation Officers (EOs)

- a. EOs will assist the BTLC in raising the alarm and ensuring everyone has moved to a place of safety (the assembly point); and
- b. Will ensure that evacuees follow the agreed evacuation route to the assembly point.

4.3. Assembly Officers (AOs)

- a. AOs will ensure that all staff and pupil lists are updated; and
- b. Will, at the assembly point, check that all staff and pupils are accounted for and report any missing staff or pupils to the BTLC / Officer in Charge (OIC).

5. BOMB, THREAT AND LOCKDOWN ALERTS

The main issues to consider in preparation for potential bomb threat within your setting are:

5.1. Bomb Warnings

If the threat is delivered through a **telephone call**:

- When a call is received continue the conversation whilst attempting to alert a colleague to the issue. See [Appendix A](#);
- The BTLC and the Police **must** be notified immediately by the person taking the call;
- In consultation with the Police the BTLC will make a decision on whether to evacuate their setting; and
- The person receiving the call should try to remain calm and get as much information as possible.

If the threat is delivered **face-to-face**:

- Try to remember as many distinguishing characteristics of the threat-maker as possible.

If discovered in a **written note, letter** or as **graffiti**:

- Treat as police evidence and secure the scene so as not to contaminate the evidence, e.g. prevent other people touching 'it'.

If the threat is received via **email** or **social media application**:

- Do not reply to, forward or delete the message;
- Note the sender's email address or username / user ID for social media applications; and Preserve all web log files for your organisations to help the police investigation (as a guide, 7-days prior to the threat message and 48-hours after).

5.2. Suspected Devices in and around your Setting

- Where a package is suspected of presenting a threat, do not touch or move it;
- Do not use any radio transmitting or electronic devices, including mobile phones within **15-metres** of a suspected device;
- The BTLC and the Police must be notified immediately; and
- After consultation with the Police the BTLC will make a decision on whether to internally or externally evacuate the building.
- Do not forget suspicious or out of place vehicles (Type, location, make and model (if known), registration / license plate, is the vehicle known or accounted for).

5.3. Delivered Threat Items

Delivered items which pose a threat, 'delivered threat items', may include malicious letters, parcels, packages and anything delivered by post or courier and are a commonly used tactic by criminals and terrorists. A properly conducted risk assessment should give you a good idea of the likely threat to your organisation and indicate precautions you need to take. Delivered threat items may contain:

- Explosive or incendiary devices,
- Sharps or blades,
- Offensive materials, or
- Chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) materials or devices.

The phrase 'white powders' is often used in the context of mail and encompasses CBR material as well as benign materials (note: such materials may not be white and may not be powders). Anyone receiving a suspicious delivery is unlikely to know which type it is, so procedures should cater for every eventuality.

A delivered threat item which utilises some form of explosive device is likely to have received some rough handling in the post and is therefore unlikely to detonate through being moved. Any attempt to open it however, may set it off or release the contents.

Delivered threat items come in a variety of shapes and sizes; a well-made device might look innocuous, but there may be tell-tale signs.

See [Appendix B](#) for 'Indicators of Potential Delivered Threat Items'.

What You Can Do

You could discover a potential delivered threat item in a mail room, or anywhere else in your setting and as such you should ensure you have the appropriate emergency response plan in place.

The first step will be the identification of a potential delivered threat item and recognition that an incident has occurred, although the precise nature of the incident might not be known at this time, e.g., CBR, incendiary etc. (see [Appendix B](#)).

Following recognition of a potential delivered threat item the response procedure should be initiated including communication with emergency services who will provide the appropriate response.

Ensuring that all staff are familiar with the response procedure is key to its successful implementation and giving consideration to the following points will help with developing and planning your response procedure:

- Ensure that forethought is put into communication with both staff and the emergency services,
- Ensure that doors can be closed quickly, if required,
- Pre-plan your evacuation routes, ensuring they do not lead building occupants through affected areas,
- Consider how you will communicate the evacuation routes to occupants during an incident, the level of evacuation may vary depending on the nature of an incident and may not require the evacuation of your setting,

- Consult with your Building Services Manager on the feasibility of emergency shutdown or isolation of heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems (including local extraction systems, e.g. in kitchens) and ensure that any such plans are rehearsed.

Due to the complexity of HVAC systems and variability across buildings and sites it is not possible to provide generic advice on the alteration or otherwise of HVAC systems in response to an incident and therefore consultation with your Building Services Manager and / or a specialist HVAC engineer is essential.

If you feel you are in possession of a possible delivered threat item having given consideration to the indicators listed previously and within [Appendix B](#) then the following points should form part of your response procedures, unless directed otherwise by the emergency services:

- Avoid unnecessary handling of the suspicious item,
- If you are holding the item, put it down on a cleared flat surface (if possible),
- Keep it separate so it is easily identifiable,
- Clear immediate area and each adjacent room, including rooms above and below,
- If there is any suggestion of CBR material(s), move those directly affected to a safe location close to the incident and keep these individuals separate from those not involved,
- Prevent others from approaching or accessing the cleared areas,
- Do not use mobile telephones or two-way radios in the cleared area or within 15x metres of the suspicious package,
- Communicate regularly with staff, parents and any visitors,
- If the item has been opened, or partially opened prior to being deemed suspicious, it is vital that this is communicated to the police,
- Ensure informants and witnesses remain available to brief the police, and that the accuracy of their observations is preserved: encourage witnesses to immediately record their observations in writing, and discourage them from discussing the incident or their observations with others prior to the arrival of police.

Additional CBR Specific Actions

- If a CBR incident is suspected, then undertake improvised decontamination of contaminated individuals as quickly as possible, ideally within the first 15-minutes,
- In the event of a CBR incident occurring it is advised that lifts should not be used in order to move around, or evacuate the building,
- If the alteration of the HVAC system features within your response plan (as discussed above), this should be undertaken as quickly as possible.

First-Aid

You do not need to make any special arrangements for medical care beyond normal first-aid provision. The emergency services will take responsibility for the treatment of casualties. However, provision of materials to undertake improvised decontamination (absorbent materials and water) in a suitable location (i.e. where you would likely evacuate contaminated staff) may be appropriate.

Planning Your Mail Handling and Screening Procedures

Although not all suspicious items will be a viable delivered threat item you may not be able to determine this without support from the emergency services. Communication with the emergency services therefore is important in triggering the appropriate response, as highlighted previously.

A risk assessment is fundamental in ensuring that any measures or procedures you implement are proportional to the risks you face. Your local police Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) can assist with this process by providing information to support threat and impact assessments, as well as relevant mitigation measures.

Further practical measures you might be able to take when planning your response might be:

- Consider processing all incoming mail and deliveries at one point only. This should ideally be off-site or in a separate building, or at least in an area that can easily be isolated and in which deliveries can be handled without taking them through other parts of the building,
- Consider your setting's response should there be any changes to your setting's risk assessment or mail streams,
- Ensure that all staff who handle mail are briefed and trained on how to recognise and respond to the threats your setting might face. Include reception staff and encourage regular correspondents to put their return address on each item,
- Ensure all sources of incoming mail (e.g. Royal Mail, couriers, and hand delivery) are included within your overall screening process. Note that not all mail streams may require the same level of screening (e.g. if it is deemed lower risk, such as internal mail),
- Staff need to be aware of the usual pattern of deliveries and to be briefed on unusual deliveries,
- Consider the physical protective measures you require to protect your setting (e.g. blast protection, dedicated HVAC systems and specialist filtration, washing and shower facilities) and those undertaking mail screening,
- Measures taken should be proportionate to the level of screening that is undertaken, but consider the highest anticipated level of screening that may be required, as physical protective measures may be challenging to alter in response to any change in threat,
- Make certain mail handling areas can be promptly evacuated,
- Rehearse evacuation procedures and routes as well as communication mechanisms which would be used throughout the incident,
- Staff who are responsible for mail handling should be made aware of the importance of self-isolation and the mail item of concern in reducing contamination (i.e. leave it where it is, do not transport this to another part of the setting for further inspection).

6. SEARCH CONSIDERATIONS

In order to carry out an effective search in response to a hostile threat, consider the following:

- Ensure robust, regularly practised plans are in place;
- Identify who will coordinate and take responsibility for conducting searches;
- Initiating a search by coded message, over a public address system for example, by text message or by telephone;
- Divide the setting into areas of a size manageable for 1 or 2 searchers. Ideally staff should follow a search plan and search in pairs to ensure nothing is missed;
- Ensure those conducting searches are familiar with their areas of responsibility. Those who work regularly in an area are best placed to spot unusual or suspicious items;
- Focus on areas that are easily accessible by the public, enclosed areas (e.g. cloakrooms, stairs, corridors, lifts etc.), evacuation routes and assembly points; car parks, other external areas such as goods or loading bays;
- Develop appropriate techniques for staff to be able to routinely search areas without alarming staff, pupils or any visitors;
- Under no circumstances should a suspicious item found during a search be touched or moved in any way and if any such item is found you should immediately refer back to [Section 5.2.](#); and

- Ensure all staff, pupils, contractors, visitors etc. know who to report a suspicious item to and that they have the confidence to report suspicious behaviour.

7. EVACUATION

7.1. The Credibility of Threats

Evaluating the credibility of a threat is a critical task, particularly if exposure to the threat is thought to be imminent. Determining the likelihood of a threat being credible will likely require consultation with the police or other relevant emergency service. Providing information relating to a threat that is purposefully vague or makes you question its credibility is a tactic often used by those with hostile intent to place additional pressure on decision makers. When specific intelligence is known to police, appropriate advice will be issued accordingly. However, in the absence of being able to confidently determine the credibility of a particular threat it will be necessary to consider a number of different factors:

- Is the threat part of a series?
- If so, what has happened elsewhere or previously?
- Can the location of the claimed bomb(s) / threat be known with precision? If so, is a bomb or threat visible or known at the location identified?
- Considering the motivation of a hoaxer might be to influence behaviour, is there any reason to believe their words, do they seem credible?
- If the threat is imprecise or vague, could an external or internal evacuation inadvertently move people closer to the threat?
- Could other threats be present in areas to which external or internal evacuation might progress?

7.2. Reasons to evacuate premises:

Responsibility for the initial action to be taken subject to a suspected bomb or other threat (see [Section 1.1](#)) sits with the BTLC, not the police (see [Appendix E](#)). However all threats, bomb or otherwise, should be reported to the police and their advice should be followed accordingly. Evacuation considerations may include but not be limited to:

- An assessment of the credibility of the threat has been made and the threat is aimed directly at the setting or elsewhere;
- Information relating to the threat has been provided by the police and is aimed directly at the setting or elsewhere;
- There has been a discovery of a suspected device within your setting (e.g. a postal package, an unclaimed holdall or rucksack); and
- Discovery of a suspected device or possible VBIED immediately outside of the setting or within the setting's grounds.

7.3. Evacuation plans may involve:

- Full evacuation of the setting to the assembly point, or other place of safety (see [Appendix C](#));
- Partial external or internal evacuation of part of the setting to a place of safety if the device is small and thought to be a one-off and confined to a specific location; or
- For a suspected CBR incident;
 - If a CBR incident is suspected improvised decontamination of contaminated individuals should be undertaken as quickly as possible and ideally within the first 15x minutes of the suspected exposure to the contaminant,

- Those suspected of having been contaminated should remain together in one room and away from others,
- Evacuate adjacent rooms and those above and below the suspected source of contamination,
- In the event of a CBR incident occurring it is advised that lifts should not be used in order to move around or evacuate the building,
- If the alteration of the HVAC system features within your response plan (as discussed earlier), this should be undertaken as quickly as possible.

7.4. Internal evacuation:

This involves staying in the building but moving people away from external windows / walls and in to protected spaces / internal compartments and is relevant when,

- It is necessary to move staff, pupils and other setting occupants into safe areas whilst decisions over evacuation are being made: or
- It is known that a bomb / threat is not within or immediately adjacent to your setting.

If a suspect device is outside the setting it may put people in danger if the evacuation route takes them past the device. A safer alternative maybe the use of internal protected spaces.

7.5. Points to consider when it has been decided to evacuate the building:

- Mobile phones should not be used and should be set to silent and with any vibration function disabled,
- The fire alarm is not to be used,
- Car parks should not be used as assembly areas,
- On evacuation, personal items should be left behind and buildings should not be re-entered,
- The decision to evacuate **must** be made by the BTLC and in consultation with the Police unless there is an immediate threat to life,
- Staff and pupils should be able to readily distinguish between fire alarms and bomb / threat alerts. The bomb / threat alert system should be tested at regular times (similar to the fire alarm system) so staff and pupils get the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the differences between the two. Be sure to account for staff rotas so all staff get to experience the differences between the two systems,
- Evacuation procedures must consider preventing unauthorised access to the setting,
- Staff or pupils subject to an existing PEEP should be individually briefed on their evacuation procedures,
- If the location of the perceived threat has been identified, evacuate using a route which avoids that area,
- Depending on the size of the suspected device, the assembly point should be,
 - **100 metres for small items** including parcel bombs,
 - **200 metres for larger items** including cars,
 - **400 metres for vans and LGV's.**

These are minimum distances and should be behind cover such as concrete or brick and away from glass or other material which may fragment and cause injury.

7.6. Procedures to be followed on full evacuation:

- BTLCs to identify assembly areas and safe evacuation routes (see [Appendix C](#)). The evacuation route should be co-ordinated to avoid entering the area near to the suspect threat;
- For significant threats it would be prudent to co-ordinate your evacuation routes with neighbouring premises.
- BTLCs to brief Evacuation and Assembly Officers;
- BTLCs to ensure all staff, pupils and other building users (contractors, visitors, etc.) are alerted to the fact that a viable threat has been identified and that they are notified of the nominated assembly areas and safe evacuation routes;
- Prior to evacuation and **only** if safe to do so, staff should make a cursory search of their own area for any suspicious packages or other potential threats and report anything suspicious to the Assembly Officer;
- BTLC to liaise with Critical Incident Emergency Response (Education at Rutland House) who will assist with communications and inform relevant departments / persons, Discussions should be had ahead of time to identify relevant departments / persons;
- BTLCs should be aware that those with hostile intent may use secondary devices that could be employed on the evacuation route or at the assembly point; and
- BTLCs should be aware of secondary hazards at assembly points such as gas or electrical installations, glass or any other material that may become a hazard during an incident.

7.7. Re-occupation:

Responsibility for reoccupation sits with the BTLC, not the police, any advice they give should however be followed accordingly:

- If possible the building should be searched prior to reoccupation; and
- The decision to reoccupy should be made by the BTLC in consultation with the Police.

7.8. Procedures if it is decided not to evacuate:

This will be reasonable and proportionate if after evaluation the threat is assessed as implausible or a hoax. Police will provide additional advice and guidance and the following action must be taken:

- a. Notify Critical Incident Emergency Response (Education at Rutland House); and
- b. A proportionate search of the premises should be considered.

8. TESTING PROCEDURES

Ensuring staff and pupils are familiar with the bomb, threat and lockdown procedures through regular testing and exercising will increase the likelihood of an effective response to a threat event which requires evacuation, whether it be a partial or full, or an internal or external evacuation and will ensure staff and pupils are confident with implementing the procedures and are familiar with all available and potential evacuation routes and assembly points.

Disabled staff and pupils should already have a suitable and sufficient PEEP in place and they should be individually briefed on their evacuation procedures. Similarly all visitors should be briefed on evacuation procedures and quickly identified and assisted in the event of a threat.

9. LETTER TO PARENTS

After an incident the Head teacher may decide to formally notify parents and a draft letter template which you are free to adopt and amend as necessary is contained in [Appendix D](#).

10. MORE INFORMATION

[REP-SCH-GUI-40.x Security Guidelines](#) - As Jun 2022 the current version of this document is 40.7.

[Advice for Young People](#)

[Resources for Schools and Youth Organisations](#)

[ACT \(Action Counters Terrorism\) Awareness e-Learning](#)

11. VERSION CONTROL

Version	Date	Amendment
1	Jan-10	Policy Created
2	Jan-13	Amendments highlighted by Police Security officer, email
3	Jul-15	Updated date of review
4	Feb-16	Updated with Government guidance
5	Jun-16	Updated with Government guidance
6	Jun-22	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Document updated from MS Word 97-2003 (.doc) to MS Word (.docx).• Grammar / wording / formatting changes throughout.• Hyperlinked external sources where possible.• Major revision to 'Introduction' section to reflect more relevant assessment of potential threats.• Guidance throughout updated to better align with current guidance (e.g. NaCTSO, CPNI)• Title changed to 'Bomb, Threat and Lockdown Emergency Procedures Policy'.

Appendix A

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB OR OTHER THREAT BY TELEPHONE:

1. Remain calm and talk to the caller.
2. Note the caller's number if displayed on your phone.
3. If the threat has been sent via email or social media - (see appropriate section below).
4. If you are able to, record the call.
5. Write down the exact wording of the threat:

ASK THESE QUESTIONS AND RECORD THE ANSWERS AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE:

1. Where exactly is the bomb / threat right now?

2. When is it going to detonate?

3. What does it look like?

4. What does the bomb / threat contain?

5. How will it be detonated?

6. Did you place the bomb / threat? If not you, who did?

7. What is your name?

8. What is your address?

9. What is your telephone number?

10. Do you represent a group or are you acting alone?

11. Why have you placed the bomb / threat?

12. Record time completed?

INFORM BUILDING SECURITY OR CO-ORDINATING MANAGER:

Name and telephone number of person informed:

DIAL 999 AND INFORM POLICE:

Time informed:

The following parts should be completed once the caller has hung up and police / building security / co-ordinating manager have all been informed:

Date and time of call:

Duration of call:

The telephone number that received the call:

--	--	--

About the caller:

☐

Male

☐

Female

☐

Age

Nationality

Threat language:

☐

Well spoken

☐

Irrational

☐

Taped

☐

Foul

☐

Incoherent

Caller's voice:

☐

Calm

☐

Slurred

☐

Lisp

Familiar (if so, who did it sound like?)

☐

Crying

☐

Excited

☐

Rapid

☐

Clearing throat

☐

Stutter

☐

Deep

Accent (If so what accent?)

☐

Angry

☐

Disguised

☐

Laughter

☐

Nasal

☐

Slow

☐

Hoarse

Other (please specify)

Other sounds:

☐

Street Noises

☐

Motor

☐

PA System

☐

Office Machinery

☐

House Noises

☐

Clear

☐

Booth

☐

Animal Noises

☐

Voice

☐

Music

☐

Crockery

☐

Static

☐

Factory Machinery

Other (please specify)

--

Remarks:

--

Additional notes:

--

Signature:

--

Print name:

--

Date:

--

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB OR OTHER THREAT SENT VIA EMAIL OR SOCIAL MEDIA:

1. Do not reply to, forward or delete the message,
2. If sent via email, note the address,
3. If sent via social media, what application has been used and what is the username / ID?
4. Dial 999 and follow police guidance,
5. Preserve all web log files for your organisation to help the police investigation (it is suggested that you retain the 7x days prior to receiving the threat and for 48x hours after).

SAVE AND PRINT

HAND COPY TO POLICE AND BUILDING SECURITY / CO-ORDINATING MANAGER

Retention period: 7x years.

Appendix B

Indicators of Potential Delivered Threat Items

Particular attention should be given to the following points when assessing whether a delivered item poses a threat or not:

General Indicators

- An unexpected item, especially if hand delivered,
- A padded envelope ('Jiffy Bag') or other bulky package,
- An additional inner envelope or other contents that may be difficult to remove,
- Labelling or excessive sealing that encourages opening at a particular end or in a particular way,
- Oddly shaped or lopsided,
- An envelope stuck down completely (normally gummed envelope flaps leave slight gaps of around 3-5mm at the corners / edges of the flap),
- Restrictive markings 'personal', 'confidential' or 'only to be opened by....',
- An item addressed to the organisation or a title (rather than a specific individual),
- Unexpected / unusual origin (postmark and / or return address), foreign mail, special deliveries,
- No return address or return address that cannot be verified,
- Poorly or inaccurately addressed and / or address printed unevenly or unusually,
- Misspellings of commonly known words,
- Unfamiliar writing, or unusual style,
- Unusual postmark, or no postmark,
- More stamps than needed for size or weight of package,
- Greasy or oily stains and / or odours emanating from package.

Explosive or Incendiary Indicators

- Unusually heavy or uneven weight distribution,
- Small hole(s) in envelope or wrapping,
- The presence of wiring.

Chemical, Biological or Radiological (CBR), 'White Powder' Indicators

- Powders or liquids emanating from package,
- Wrapping stained by liquid leakage,
- Marked with written warning(s),
- Unexpected items or materials found in package upon opening or x-raying (loose or in container) such as powdered, crystalline or granular solids; liquids; sticky substances or residues,
- Unexpected odours upon opening,
- Sudden onset of illness or irritation of skin, eyes and nose.

More Information

Further information on mail screening / handling can be found on the [Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure](#) (CPNI) website.

IF IN DOUBT CALL 999 AND ASK FOR THE POLICE.

CLEAR THE AREA IMMEDIATELY.

DO NOT ATTEMPT TO OPEN THE LETTER OR PACKAGE.

AVOID UNNECESSARY HANDLING.

KEEP IT SEPARATE SO IT IS EASILY IDENTIFIABLE.

CONTACT 999 AND ASK FOR THE POLICE.

Appendix C

(Oakfield Community Primary School & Nursery)

Bomb Lockdown Threat Coordinator (BTLC)

Joanne Makin (Headteacher)

Tel: 0151 424 4958 Ext: _____

Deputies (EOs and AOs)

Tom Faulkner (Key Stage 2 Lead) (AO)

Tel: _____ Ext: _____

Paul Lewis (Site Manager) (EO)

Tel: _____ Ext: _____

Assembly Area(s) Location(s)

1. St Michael with St Thomas Church, WA8 8HY.

BTLC to:

1. Assess threat level; and
2. Liaise with Police.

And decide:

1. To do nothing; or
2. Search building without evacuation; or
3. Evacuate immediately; and
4. When to reoccupy the setting.

BTLC to identify assembly areas and safe evacuation routes:

- ✓ **100 metres for small items**
including parcel bombs
- ✓ **200 metres for larger items**
including cars
- ✓ **400 metres for vans and LGV's**

The evacuation route should be coordinated to avoid entering the area near any suspicious packages.

Notify Internally

(In the event of an incident call the Major Incident Team phone on _____)

	Notified:	Yes	No
1. _____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. _____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. _____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Notify Externally

	Notified:	Yes	No
1. _____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. _____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. _____		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

1. BTLC to brief Evacuation and Assembly Officers;

2. All staff, pupils and visitors to be alerted to the fact that it is a bomb alert and are to be notified of the nominated assembly points and safe evacuation routes;

4. Prior to evacuation and if safe to do so, all staff to make cursory search of their own area for any suspicious packages and report to Assembly Officer.

This document is **confidential** and is for relevant personnel **only**.

The Major Incident Team phone is for use by the BTLC **only** and **must not** be passed to third parties.

Appendix D

DRAFT LETTER FOR SCHOOLS & EDUCATION ESTABLISHMENTS TO CONSIDER USING IF AN INCIDENT AFFECTS THEIR PREMISES

Dear Student, Parent or Carer
dd-mm-yyyy

Following a number of hoax bomb threats to schools across the UK this letter provides an update to students, their parents and carers.

Each call has caused significant disruption to school life, upset to school staff and concern to pupils, their parents and carers.

The police treat bomb threats very seriously and are committed to working with schools to ensure the safety of all students and to minimise disruption to their learning.

Upon receiving information relating to a bomb threat the following action will be taken:

- Every bomb threat will be assessed. Highly experienced officers review intelligence and work with counter-terrorism experts who have an in-depth knowledge of incidents of this nature and they will assess whether a threat is real or not. So far, there has been no credible threat posed to student safety and all the calls have been malicious in nature and designed to cause fear and disruption.
- Police will conduct a criminal investigation. Making a bomb threat is a serious crime punishable by up to seven years imprisonment. Police forces, where necessary, will work together to find those responsible and charges will be brought against perpetrators accordingly.
- Police have refreshed guidance with the Department for Education to share with leaders of schools, other education establishments, and authorities. This guidance also signposts to advice on wider security reviews and supports existing safeguarding plans. Public guidance on how you, schools and the council can prepare for emergencies can be found at: www.gov.uk/local-planning-emergency-major-incident;


There is a real threat from terrorism and it is important that we are alert but not alarmed. Schools remain some of the safest and most secure settings and the wellbeing of students is the top priority of staff.

To help us we ask the following of you:-


- If the school makes a decision to temporarily suspend lessons while safety checks are carried out, do not attend to remove your child unless asked to do so. Schools will keep you informed and always arrange care for students unable to return home or whose parents / carers are unable to collect them. Do not phone the emergency services to ask for updates on your child as it delays genuine people in need from getting help.
- Consider speaking to your child about the consequences of making hoax calls.
- If you have any information about those responsible for the security alerts call police on 101 (999 in an emergency) or the independent charity Crime Stoppers anonymously on 0800 555 111.

Appendix E


Scenario 1



Scenario 2




Scenario 3



See following page:

OAKFIELD COMMUNITY PRIMARY AND NURSERY SCHOOL

BTLC TO MAKE DECISION BASED ON CREDIBILITY OF THREAT AND IN CONSULTATION WITH THE POLICE



Appendix F

Emergency Lockdown Plan					
Threat / Incident	High or Low Status	Full or Partial Lockdown	Signals for Full or Partial Lockdown	Rooms suitable for lockdown	Procedures
An aggressive and threatening school visitor	H	F	To be determined	To be determined	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Full lockdown signal initiated. ▪ If outside pupils brought back in to the school building and remain in classrooms. ▪ External doors and windows closed and securely locked. ▪ Headteacher/Senior Leader determine whether to contact emergency services. ▪ Register taken in class. ▪ Identified school personnel search for unaccounted for pupils. ▪ Classroom doors locked. ▪ Window blinds drawn. ▪ If possible, blackout door window. ▪ Lights turned off. ▪ Everyone remain quiet. ▪ Pupils to stay out of sight either under desks or around a discreet corner. ▪ Class teacher remains in contact with Headteacher/Senior Leaders. ▪ If instructed pupils move to secure lockdown zone in school. ▪ If fire alarm sounds, everyone evacuates school building assembling at pre-determined assembly points.
An intruder in the school grounds or school building	H	F	To be determined	To be determined	
A bomb threat	H	F	To be determined	To be determined	
A fire arms or weapons attack	H	F	To be determined	To be determined	
An environmental emergency such as air pollution from a cloud of gas or plume of smoke	H	F	To be determined	To be determined	

					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> School personnel notified when threat has ended through three knocks on the door/vocal message. Evaluation of incident undertaken by Headteacher/Senior Leaders.
A dangerous dog in the school grounds	L	P	To be determined	To be determined	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Partial lockdown signal initiated. If outside pupils brought back in to the school building and remain in classrooms. External doors and windows closed and securely locked. Register taken in class. Identified school personnel search for unaccounted for pupils. Risk assessments undertaken to determine whether pupils and school personnel may have free movement if need be. Headteacher/Senior Leaders determine whether to contact emergency services. Decision communicated to all school personnel. Headteacher/Senior Leaders decide whether the situation warrants moving to full lockdown. School personnel notified when threat has ended through three knocks on the door/vocal message. Evaluation of incident undertaken by Headteacher/Senior Leaders.
A house or building fire close to the school	L	P	To be determined	To be determined	
A local civil disturbance	L	P	To be determined	To be determined	